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Abstract. The object of this paper is to sound out the perception of economic agents on the regulatory mechanisms 
presently in force, and on others which are possible (fishing rights), with the objective of analysing the questions posed in 
the case of Galicia, Spain. We characterise in the first place the agents and the rules in the Galician fishing regulation, and 
from this we design a questionnaire to obtain the required information. The questionnaire is given to a significant sample of 
fishermen and companies of the sector, and is contrasted with the opinion of the nearest regulator. In the conclusions, we 
emphasize some points of agreement, such as the necessity of controlling the fishing effort, the transferability of fishing 
rights and their multiannual duration, emphasising that the latter aspects have rarely been experienced in Galicia. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The success of a regulatory system becomes more 
uncertain with the greater complexity of a fishery.  
In general, it is more difficult to regulate multi-
species fisheries, resources with complex bio-
ecological relations and multi-fleet fisheries.   
Complexity also increases with the size of a fishery 
and the number of its members, and with greater 
mobility both of resource and of fishermen. (Arnason 
1991, 1994; Wilen 1989; Townsend 1990; 
Hannesson 1994; Bjorndal 1992). 
But, also, the possibilities of success depend on the 
existing institutions and on the social and political 
interaction under which it is applied.  It is advisable 
that fishing administration develops credibility 
among the fishermen, and that they feel they are 
participants in the decision-making and regulatory 
processes so that they are applied with a high level 
of legitimacy. (North, 1990; Ostrom, 1990; Schlager 
and Ostrom, 1992; Jentoft and McCay, 1995; 
Gallastegui and Chamorro, 1997; Guillotreau, 
1997). 
In this sense, if the fishermen carry out their activity with 
a high degree of uncertainty and think that in future they 
will not be able to continue fishing (either due to changes 
in fishing policy, or for the predatory attitude of other 
insufficiently controlled fishermen), they will have a less 
respectful attitude toward the natural resource.  The 
involvement of the fishermen in decision-making, in the 
regulation and control, is therefore of maximum interest.  
The fishermen will have the incentive to involve 
themselves in these processes so long as they are 
guaranteed that they possess fishing rights respected by 
the rest of the fishermen, by the economic agents and by 
the administration. 
One possible way to advance in these indicated directions 
could consist of the progressive implementation of 
individual fishing rights, both over a portion of the 
resource (quota), and over the capacity to exercise effort 
(licence).  The defining of these rights would have 
positive effects: to eliminate uncertainty over who has 
fishing rights, to simplify the regulatory rules and more 
deeply involve the fishermen in the rational exploitation 
of the resource. (Neher, Arnason y Mollet, 1989). 
 The objective of this study is to sound out the perception 
of the economic agents over the regulatory mechanisms 
in force and over other possible regulations (fishing 
rights in the sense previously mentioned) with the aim of 
analysing the questions posed by the particular case of 
Galicia. 
  
2. QUESTIONNAIRE AND SAMPLE 
To accomplish our objective we plan the enclosed 
questionnaire, separating in it the evaluation of measures 
in force (Table 1: question 1) and other new possibilities 
(question 2, in some cases only partially introduced in 
Spain).  In each question there are two boxes referring IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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successively to measures which affect, respectively, the 
control of effort and the control of production.  In each 
case segments of the fleet are separated in/by function of 
the fishing arts.  Four degrees are offered to respond to 
each question. 
TABLE 1. QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY MEASURES 
 
UESTION: 1.1. In relation to present regulations, in your opinion, how effective are the following 
control measures of fishing effort? 
EASURES ABOUT: Tonnage, length or power of the ship, size of mesh, length of gear, days at sea. 
ALUATION: No effectiveness, little, enough, much. 
UESTION: 1.2. In relation to present regulations, in your opinion, how important are production control 
measures? 
EASURES ABOUT: TACs per year, daily quota, size of minimum catch, period of closed season, closed 
areas, limited discards. 
VALUATION: None, little, enough, much. 
 
 
2. EVALUATION OF POSSIBILITIES OF REGULATION 
 
ESTION: 2.1. Licences: If the regulatory organizations were to propose a new system based on fishing 
licences, evaluate whether or not some characteristics that this system could have are favourable. 
EASURES ABOUT: Annual duration, multiannual duration, transferability among fishermen, 
connection to the area, restriction of inputs, control of effort. 
ALUATION: None favourable, little, enough, very favourable. 
ESTION: 2.2. Quotas: Evaluate the characteristics that this could have on the system. 
EASURES ABOUT: Annual duration of rights, multiannual duration, transferability among fishermen, 
connected to the area, restriction of inputs. 
VALUATION: Not favourable, little, enough, very favourable. 
 
 
REGULATOR    2 
MANAGERS 16 
FISHERMEN:    
Purse Seine ......…………....  17 
Coastal........………………..  15 
Lines and gillnets .…………  14 
Trawl (Fresh).....…………....  11 
Pelagic Long-line.…………..  17 
Gran Sol fleet (EU grounds).. 18 
Freezer ships .............……..   11 
 TOTAL    121 
The sample is of 121 questionnaires, according to the 
composition in Table 2. The questionnaires of regulators 
correspond to those responsible for political and 
technical aspects of the fishing administration of Galicia.  
The questionnaires of ‘managers’ include directors and 
representatives of fishing associations.  
Those relative to fishermen were answered by ship-
owners, captains and crews of ships which carry out 
fishing activity in some of those segments that are 
specified. 
 
 
3. RESULTS 
The results obtained acquire more significance when 
gathered under specific segments, according to the 
criteria already mentioned. In this way, given the type of 
questionnaire and the design of the sample, the general 
results will have significance in situations of a high level 
of consensus and unanimity, but not throughout the 
averages obtained in each response. For the presentation 
of the results we have established, therefore, three 
principal sections: regulators (Table 3), managers (Table 
4), and fishermen in general (Table 5). IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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Table 3: Regulators 
       
1. Evaluation of regulatory measures      
1.1 Control of effort            
  Type of ship  Mesh 
size 
Length gear  Days at sea        
Gillnet B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M      
Trawl  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M      
Purse-seine  B/M     B/M  B/M       
Pelagic-longline  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M      
Demersal-
longline 
B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M      
Coastal                   
 
1.2. Production control 
    
  TAC  Daily 
quota 
Minimum 
size 
Closed 
season 
Closed area  Discards   
Gillnet B/M      B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
Trawl  B/M     B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
Purse-seine B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
Pelagic-longline  B/M     B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
Demersal-
longline 
B/M     B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
Coastal                     
              
2. Evaluation of possiblities of regulation        
   Annual 
duration 
Multi-
annual 
duration 
Transfera-
bility 
Connected 
to area 
Restriction 
of inputs 
Effort 
Licences Gillnet  N/P  B/M B/M B/M B/M  B/M 
 Trawl  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M 
 Purse-seine  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M 
 Pelagic-longline  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M 
 Demersal-
longline 
N/P B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M 
 Coastal                   
  Annual 
duration 
Multi-
annual 
duration 
Transfera-
bility 
Connected 
to area 
Restriction 
of inputs 
 
Quotas Gillnet  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
 Trawl  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
 Purse-seine  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
 Pelagic-longline  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
 Demersal-
longline 
N/P B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
 Coastal                  
B/M: enough or much                         =: equal/the same                 N/P:none or little 
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Table 4: Managers Of Ownership Associations    
1. Evaluation of regulatory measures        
1.1 Control of effort            
  Type of 
ship 
Mesh size  Length gear  Days ot 
sea 
      
Gillnet N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P      
Trawl  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M      
Purse-seine  -  B/M  B/M  B/M      
Pelagic-longline  B/M  B/M  B/M  -      
Demersal-
longline 
B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M      
Coastal -  -  N/P  B/M       
 
 
 
1.2. Production control 
      
  TAC  Daily quota  Minimum 
size 
Period of 
closed 
season 
Closed 
area 
Discards   
Gillnet B/M  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  N/P   
Trawl B/M  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  N/P   
Purse-seine N/P  B/M B/M  B/M  B/M  N/P   
Pelagic-longline B/M  N/P  -  B/M  -  N/P   
Demersal-
longline 
B/M N/P  B/M B/M  B/M N/P   
Coastal N/P  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  N/P   
 
 
 
           
2. Evaluation of possibilities of regulation        
   Annual 
duration 
Multi-
annual 
duration 
Transferibi
-lity 
Connecte
d to the 
area 
Restriction 
of inputs 
Effort 
Licences  Gillnet  N/P B/M B/M  N/P B/M  B/M 
 Trawl  N/P  B/M  B/M  -  B/M  B/M 
 Purse-seine  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  -  B/M 
 Pelagic-longline  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  B/M  B/M 
 Demersal-longlin N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  B/M  B/M 
 Coastal  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  N/P  B/M 
     Annual 
duration 
Multi-
annual 
duration 
Transferibi
-lity 
Connecte
d to the 
area 
Restriction 
of inputs 
 
Quotas Gillnet  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P N/P   
 Trawl  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  B/M   
 Purse-seine  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  N/P   
 Pelagic-longline  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  B/M   
 Demersal-longlin N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  -   
  Coastal  N/P N/P B/M  N/P N/P   
B/M: enough or much                     N/P: none or little                         -: imperceptible difference 
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Table 5: Fishermen          
1. Evaluation of regulatory measures      
1.1 Control of effort            
  Type of ship  Mesh size  Length gear  Days at sea    
Coastal B/M  B/M  N/P  N/P      
Gillnets  - B/M  B/M  B/M      
Longlines N/P  N/P  B/M  B/M       
Trawl  B/M  N/P  B/M  B/M      
Purse  seiners  B/M B/M B/M  B/M       
Pelagic longline  B/M  N/P  B/M  B/M       
Grand Sol Trawl  B/M  B/M  N/P  B/M       
Grand Sol longline  B/M  N/P  B/M  B/M       
Freezers  B/M  B/M  N/P  B/M      
 
1.2.Production control 
      
  TAC  Daily 
quota 
Min.size  Period of closed 
season 
Closed areas  Discards   
Coastal N/P  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  N/P   
Gillnets B/M  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
Longlines B/M  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  N/P   
Trawl N/P  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  N/P   
Purse seiners  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  N/P  N/P   
Pelagic longline  B/M  N/P  B/M  B/M  B/M  N/P   
Grand Sol Trawl  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  -   
Grand Sol longline  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  -   
Freezers B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M  B/M   
              
2. Evaluation of possibilities of regulation    
   Annual  
duration 
Multi-annual 
duration 
Transfera
-bility 
Connected to 
the area 
Restriction 
of inputs 
Effort 
Licences Coastal  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  N/P  B/M 
 Gillnets  B/M  N/P  B/M  N/P  N/P  B/M 
 Longlines  B/M  -  N/P  N/P  -  B/M 
 Trawl  B/M  B/M  N/P  N/P  B/M  B/M 
 Purse seiners  N/P  N/P  N/P  N/P  N/P  N/P 
 Pelagic longline  N/P  N/P  N/P  N/P  N/P  B/M 
 Grand Sol Trawl  B/M  B/M  B/M  N/P  -  B/M 
 Grand Sol longline B/M B/M  B/M  -  B/M  B/M 
 Freezers  N/P  N/P  B/M  N/P  -  B/M 
   Annual  
duration 
Multi-annual 
duration 
Transfera
-bility 
Connected to 
the area 
Restriction 
of inputs 
 
Quotas Coastal  N/P  B/M B/M  N/P  N/P   
 Gillnets  B/M  N/P  B/M  N/P  B/M   
 Longlines  B/M  -  B/M  N/P  B/M   
 Trawl  B/M  B/M  N/P  N/P  B/M   
 Purse seiners  N/P  N/P  B/M  N/P  N/P   
 Pelagic longline  N/P  N/P  N/P  N/P  N/P   
 Grand Sol Trawl  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  N/P   
 Grand Sol longline N/P B/M  B/M  N/P B/M   
 Freezers  N/P  B/M  B/M  N/P  N/P   
B/M: enough or much                     N/P: none or little                         -: imperceptible difference IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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At the same time, we have established some sub-sectors 
with a series of fleet segments (purse seine, pelagic long-
line, demersal long-line, trawling, coastal fishing, Gran 
Sol fisheries-EU grounds-, and freezers) obviously 
distinguishable technically and economically. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The traditional regulatory mechanisms (mesh size, ship 
and tackle characteristics, TAC and days of fishing) are 
effective instruments from the perspective of the 
regulators. The fishermen, in general, recognise their 
necessity or effectiveness but understand that they may be 
discriminatory and that they limit their business 
strategies. 
In general it is admitted that licence and quota 
transferability may be a favourable mechanism for the 
regulation of fisheries. 
Control of effort (in the case of licences) is a requisite 
evaluated positively. 
Multi-annual fishing rights (licences and quotas) is 
considered a favourable factor. 
Other possible characteristics or rights (linked to an area 
or restriction in inputs), regulators and managers 
regarded favourably, while among the fishermen there is 
a diversity of opinion depending on the fleet segment. 
There is a notable degree of consensus among the 
different agents, especially in view of new possibilities of 
regulation, based on a greater definition of fishing rights. 
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